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Abstract
Whenever citizens want their elected officials to employ funds efficiently, they are in
need of information in order to establish accountability. We develop an agency model
with imperfect monitoring where newspapers provide voters with this information.
The model predicts that an informed electorate is more likely to hold an incumbent
accountable. Using panel data on Norwegian municipalities we show that increases
in local newspaper circulation are associated with higher levels of local government
efficiency as measured by an index introduced by the Norwegian authorities.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores whether local newspaper circulation affects public sector efficiency
in Norwegian municipalities. In Norway, the central government aims to ensure equal
living conditions throughout the country. This includes the provision of welfare services
like health care, education and social services in high quality across all municipalities.
To this end, central government allocates a budget to each jurisdiction, but municipali-
ties autonomously decide on how these services can be implemented to best match local
preferences. Within the municipalities, a locally elected government is responsible for
the provision of public services. As this is the most prominent task of local government,
voters should mainly consider public service performance when deciding on the reelection
of local officials. Thus, elections provide incentives for the latter to perform well because
a more efficient use of disposable funds – implying a higher level of services, given the
fixed budget – should increase the chances of reelection.
At the municipal level, individuals usually know who is in charge of local services and
they can at the same time observe service provision in their day-to-day life. It is, however,
likely that they are not perfectly informed about all factors that determine public service
provision. In particular, when they cast their ballot, it is essential to know whether factors
that are not in control of local government have influenced service provision. If such local
or country-wide shocks have been a factor in public service production, voters who are
aware of this can judge government performance more accurately.
As local newspapers play an important role in informing voters in Norway, this study
strives to examine whether certain newspaper market characteristics can explain differ-
ences across municipalities in public service efficiency. We present a stylized model to
illustrate how the degree of information in the electorate shapes an incumbent’s incen-
tives to behave well. The central prediction of the model is that a larger share of informed
voters in the electorate makes the incumbent work harder because external factors are
not confounded with incumbent’s effort. This prediction is tested using panel data on
Norwegian municipalities for the years 2001-2005. Our main variables are an index of
public sector efficiency in Norwegian municipalities as introduced by Borge et al. (2008)
and three measures of voter information that are based on newspaper circulation at the
municipality level. The results support the model’s prediction that a more informed
electorate induces higher efficiency.
This paper is closely related to the political economy literature that deals with the impact
of mass media on policy outcomes. In a theoretical study, Stro¨mberg (2004a) examines
competition between media outlets and identifies incentives leading mass media to bias
programs in favor of certain groups. His model predicts media to report more on issues
concerning large groups, groups that are more attractive to advertising, groups that attach
a higher value to information and groups which are easier to reach in terms of distributing
news. In the model these groups are better informed and this results in favorable policies
towards them. Stro¨mberg (2004b) empirically tests whether better informed voters receive
favorable policies. He uses U.S. data on county-level spending by FERA, a major New
Deal program in the 1930s, and approximates the share of informed voters by the share
of households owning a radio. Counties with a larger share of these households are found
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to have received more funds. Besley and Burgess (2002) apply an agency model to show
that better informed voters should be more successful in holding governments accountable.
They test this prediction using panel data from India and find that – in terms of providing
disaster relief – Indian state governments are more responsive when newspaper circulation
is higher. Here, higher newspaper circulation serves as a proxy for a more informed
electorate. In a Scandinavian setting, Svaleryd and Vlachos (2007) find that increased
political competition as well as local media coverage reduce political rents in Sweden.
Additionally, the paper is related to the literature on efficiency in public service provision.
Theoretical contributions in this field go back to the work of Niskanen (1971, 1975) as well
as Migue´ and Be´langer (1974). The central aspect of these studies is that bureaucracies
strive to allocate funds from a given budget to expenditures that do not raise public service
production, thus leading to less efficiency. Hence the interests of bureaucrats collide with
the interests of politicians and voters and policy outcomes depend on the interaction of
these players.
There is a vast empirical literature on local efficiency, for a survey see De Borger &
Kerstens (2000). Many of these studies deal with efficiency in specific parts of the public
sector or programs rather than with overall efficiency. In contrast, the index of local
public sector efficiency in Norwegian municipalities that we use in this paper provides a
measure of global public sector efficiency and was first used by Borge et al. (2008). The
authors find that high fiscal capacity and a high degree of party fragmentation lead to
low efficiency, whereas increased democratic participation brings along higher efficiency
in Norwegian municipalities. The Norwegian efficiency index has also been employed by
Revelli and Tovmo (2007), who suggest that local government efficiency in Norway shows
a spatial pattern due to yardstick competition.
2 Media and Efficiency: Theoretical Links
In this section of the paper, we theoretically establish how mass media, in our case news-
papers, serve as an institution that enhances the accountability of incumbent politicians.
As it is essentially the voting behavior of the electorate that determines incumbents’ in-
centives we have to analyze the impact of newspapers on voters. It is quite reasonable
to assume that newspapers influence voting decisions because they play a key role in
providing voters with information about politicians.
We develop a stylized political economy model of a single constituency with a continuum
of voters normalized to unity. There are two periods of time.
Production of a public good
In the first period, an incumbent government provides the public good y according to the
production technology
y1 = a1 + θ
I + ε1. (1)
The level of the public good in period 1 results from the incumbent’s effort (a1 ∈ [0,∞)),
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her competence (θI) and a temporary shock (ε1). Subscripts denote the time period and
superscript I refers to the incumbent. We assume that competence, θI , is a permanent
feature of the incumbent.
With regard to Norway, one can think of y as the services that a municipality provides
to its citizens. To provide these services, municipal governments are endowed with a
fixed budget by the central government. Hence, incumbent politicians cannot raise y by
increasing revenues, but effort they exert may affect the level of public services in the
following ways:
- Bargaining between politicians and local public administration. Administration com-
petes with service production for money from the municipal budget. Local govern-
ment does have the final say on the allocation of funds, yet the public administration
heavily takes part in budgeting (Kalseth & Rattso 1998). Thus, the politicians’ bar-
gaining power affects the allocation of funds. If, for example, politicians invested
effort to raise their expertise this could increase their bargaining power and, finally,
lead to a higher level of services due to resource allocation.
- Monitoring the administration. The administration not only takes part in budgeting
but also implements political decisions. Once funds are allocated to public service
provision, the level of services is higher if these funds are used in an efficient manner.
If politicians try harder to monitor the implementation this will raise efficiency and,
consequently, the level of services.
The effect of the incumbent’s competence θI on public good production resembles the
effect of effort. θ denotes the exogenously given talent of a politician to influence public
good provision. At a given effort level, a more competent politician will provide a higher
level of public services. Finally, the shock component ε can be either a local shock or a
country-wide shock which affects the level of y.
Information
θI and ε1 are random variables. At the time when the incumbent decides about her
effort level, neither she nor the electorate know the realizations of θI and ε1. Common
knowledge are the distributions θ ∼ N(θ¯, σ2θ) and ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε).
After the incumbent has chosen effort and the values of θI and ε1 have been realized, all
voters observe the level of the public good, y1. An exogenously defined share of voters
φ reads local newspapers for reasons that are independent of politics, e.g., because they
care about news on sports, weddings, obituaries, clubs and the like. We assume that
newspapers have perfect information about ε1 and report it.
1 The probability q that a
voter i finds the information about ε1 in the newspaper depends on how much news space
s the editors assign to local politics. Thus, q = q(s) and we presume q(0) = 0, q′ > 0 and
q′′ < 0. So the probability that a voter i is informed about ε1 is φ · q(s). Given the large
electorate, the share of informed voters is also defined by φ · q(s).
1The extreme assumption that newspapers perfectly observe ε1 serves to simplify the analysis. Alterna-
tively, we could assume that newspapers only receive a less noisy signal than voters. This would not
substantially change our results.
3
Let us briefly illustrate this argument about informed voters by an example. Suppose that
there is no newspaper published in a municipality but citizens read newspapers that come
from contiguous municipalities. If these newspapers bias local coverage in favor of their
home municipalities only little space will be allocated to news about our municipality
of interest. Still, there can be many readers in this municipality but it is unlikely that
they are well informed about local politics. On the other hand, we would expect a more
informed electorate if a newspaper market and a municipality coincide geographically.
So we have two groups of voters in the electorate. A share of φ · q(s) voters are perfectly
informed about the shock component ε1. Observing y1, these voters can clearly distinguish
between the shock and the sum of the two components attributed to the incumbent. A
share of 1− φ · q(s) voters only know the distribution of ε1 and may confound the effect
of the shock on y1 with the impact of a1 and θ
I .
Timing
Now we have determined what voters know when casting the ballot. Before we examine
the incumbent’s incentives and the optimal voting behavior, we briefly summarize the
game between the incumbent and the electorate. The timing is as follows:
Period 1:
• The incumbent politician chooses effort a without knowing his own competence.
• The values of both the incumbent’s competence, θI , and the shock, ε1, are realized.
• All voters observe y1. Additionally, a share (φ · q(s)) of voters learn the value of ε1
from the newspaper.
• Elections are held. The incumbent faces a challenger whose competence is drawn
from a normal distribution with mean θ¯ and variance σ2θ .
Period 2:
• The winner of the election chooses effort.
• yI2 is realized if the incumbent of period 1 still is in office or yC2 is realized if the
challenger has won the election.
The incumbent’s incentives
The incumbent knows that the level of y1 will affect her chances of reelection. She can
influence the level of y1 by choosing a1. Effort brings along cost C(a) with C
′ > 0 and
C ′′ > 0. At the end of period 1, there is an election where the incumbent faces a randomly
drawn challenger. If the incumbent wins, she will receive an exogenous rent R > 0 from
staying in office. Thus, the incumbent chooses a1 to maximize
pI(a1) ·R− C(a1), (2)
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where pI denotes the probability that the incumbent is reelected. There is no discounting.
The first-order condition is
∂pI
∂a1
·R = C ′(a1). (3)
The first-order condition shows that the incumbent weighs the expected rent against
present cost when she chooses a1. She will increase effort as long as the marginal effect
on the expected payoff in period 2 is larger than the marginal cost of effort in period 1.
In order to analyze how effort affects the probability of reelection, pI , we have to examine
the voting decisions in the electorate.
Optimal voting behavior
All voters receive utility u = u(y) = y from the public good. Each voter cares about
y2, the level of y in period 2, and about her own ideological position in relation to the
incumbent, βi. βi is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [−β0, β0]. Negative
values of βi imply an ideological bias of voter i in favor of the incumbent, whereas positive
values mean a bias in favor of the challenger. Voter i prefers the incumbent if
y˜I2i ≥ y˜C2i + βi, (4)
where y˜I2i and y˜
C
2i denote the expected level of y in period 2 under the incumbent and
under the challenger respectively. Voters are rational and expect the competence of the
randomly drawn challenger to be θ¯. Furthermore, as there is no incentive to invest effort
in period 2 for any politician in office, all voters correctly expect that aI2 = a
C
2 = 0. Hence,
the expected level of y2 depends only on the competence of the incumbent politician in
period 2 so that
y˜I2i = θ˜
I
i and y˜
C
2i = θ˜
C
i = θ¯.
Consequently, (4) reduces to
θ˜Ii ≥ θ¯ + βi. (5)
The expected competence of the incumbent depends on the information a voter possesses.
Voters are rational and update their prior beliefs about competence using Bayes’ rule. We
have to distinguish informed voters from from uninformed voters. In each group, θ˜Ii is
the same for every single voter. From now on, θ˜Im denotes the competence as estimated
by informed voters and θ˜In labels the competence as estimated by uninformed voters.
As informed voters observe y1 and, additionally, ε1, they expect the incumbent’s compe-
tence to be
θ˜Im = y1 − a˜1 − ε1 = θI + a1 − a˜1, (6)
where a˜1 denotes effort in period 1 as expected by the voters. Uninformed voters only
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observe the value of y1 and form the expectation
θ˜In =
σ2ε θ¯ + σ
2
θ(y1 − a˜1)
σ2ε + σ
2
θ
. (7)
The incumbent wins the election if he gets more than half of all votes cast which we can
write as
φq · θ˜
I
m − θ¯ + β0
2β0
+ (1− φq) · θ˜
I
n − θ¯ + β0
2β0
≥ 1
2
. (8)
Inserting (6), (7) and (1) and rearranging, we obtain[
φq + (1− φq) σ
2
θ
σ2ε + σ
2
θ
]
· (a1 − a˜1 + θ − θ¯) + (1− φq) σ
2
θ
σ2ε + σ
2
θ
· ε1 ≥ 0. (9)
The probability of reelection, pI , is given by the probability that (9) is met.2 The left-hand
side of (9) is a normal random variable with mean
µ =
[
(φq) · σ2ε + σ2θ
σ2ε + σ
2
θ
]
· (a1 − a˜1) (10)
and variance
σ2 =
(φq)2 · σ2εσ2θ + σ4θ
σ2ε + σ
2
θ
. (11)
Now we can compute the probability of reelection as pI = 1− F (0;µ, σ2), where F is the
distribution function of the left-hand side of (9).
Equilibrium
The incumbent maximizes her objective function, (2), taking the voters’ expectations
about effort, a˜1, as given. Taking p
I = 1 − F (0;µ, σ2) into account, the first-order
condition turns into
−∂F (0;µ, σ
2)
∂µ
∂µ
∂a1
·R = f(0;µ, σ2) ∂µ
∂a1
·R = C ′(a1). (12)
An equilibrium with rational expectations requires a1 = a˜1. Thus, in euqilibrium, µ = 0
and the first-order condition is
1√
2pi · σ ·
[
(φq) · σ2ε + σ2θ
σ2ε + σ
2
θ
]
·R = C ′(a1), (13)
2To be precise, this condition only holds true for θ¯−β0 < θ˜Im, θ˜In < θ¯+β0. However, it can be shown that,
in equilibrium, pI is the probability of reelection for all θ˜Im, θ˜
I
n.
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with 1/(
√
2pi · σ) = f(0; 0, σ). The level of effort in period 1 is uniquely defined by
a1 = (C
′)−1
(
1√
2pi
· 1√
σ2ε + σ
2
θ
· (φq) · σ
2
ε + σ
2
θ√
(φq)2 · σ2εσ2θ + σ4θ
·R
)
, (14)
where (C ′)−1 is the inverse function of C ′.
This result shows that equilibrium effort hinges on the variance of the shock, σ2ε , the
variance of competence, σ2θ , the rent, R, and the share of informed voters, (φ · q(s)).
As we strive to study how the information in the electorate affects the incentives of the
incumbent, we are mainly interested in the impact of φ and s on the effort level.
Recalling that C ′ is strictly increasing we know that (C ′)−1 is strictly increasing, too. So
a1 is higher for larger values of
υ :=
1√
2pi
· 1√
σ2ε + σ
2
θ
· (φ · q(s)) · σ
2
ε + σ
2
θ√
(φ · q(s))2 · σ2εσ2θ + σ4θ
·R.
The partial derivatives of υ with respect to φ and s, respectively, yield
∂υ
∂x
> 0 for x ∈ {φ, s}.
Now we can state the main message of the model: a larger share of informed voters makes
the incumbent work harder. Consequently, for given θI and ε1, the level of the public
good, y1, is higher when many voters read newspapers and when newspapers devote more
news space, s, to information about the shock, ε1.
3 The Norwegian Situation
In the following sections, Norwegian data serve to check, whether the theoretical predic-
tions derived above hold in a real world setting. There are two main reasons why we chose
Norway as the subject of examination. First, the federal structure of Norway with a total
of more than 400 municipalities makes for an excellent subject for studying the effects of
newspapers on relatively comparable small government units. These municipalities are
responsible for a vast array of services where they can decide autonomously on how their
budget is spent. Even though local government revenues are rather fixed, this leaves a
lot of leeway for municipal officials in shaping the public service structure in their mu-
nicipality.3 Services provided by the municipality include primary and lower secondary
education, daycare, care for the elderly, welfare benefits, primary health care and child
custody. These services enter into the calculation of the efficiency index (Borge et al.
2008) which we use to evaluate the performance of local governments. The availability
3There is also another tier between the local and the national level. These fylke districts are sizewise
somewhat akin to the US counties. Their main responsibilities include secondary education, dental
services and public transportation. Since municipalities provide a broader range of services and people
tend to identify with their municipality rather than the fylke, we only consider the municipality level.
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of such an index is another reason for choosing Norway, as it mitigates the problem of
having to come up with an appropriate measure public sector accomplishments.
The most important reason for picking Norway, however, is the very diverse newspaper
landscape. Data on more than 150 newspapers are used in this paper. This is a large
number considering that Norway has a population of only roughly 4.8 million in 2008 and
it also implies that many of these newspapers have a rather local focus. Thus, in a sense
the newspaper market reflects the decentralization of the government sector. This is not
the only feature of the Norwegian newspaper sector that makes it particular. Until 2004,
Norway had the highest per (adult) capita newspaper reach worldwide. As of today it is
only surpassed by Japan in that respect (according to World Press Trends, approximately
600 newspapers per 1000 adults were sold in Norway in 2007 on a daily basis). Seven in
ten Norwegian households had one or more newspaper subscriptions in 2007. In the large
cities, 64 per cent had a newspaper subscription, while the percentage was 75 in more
scarcely populated areas.4 It seems entirely possible that this ubiquity of newspapers
leads to newspapers being especially able to serve the purpose of informing citizens and
thus helping to hold local government accountable. The reach of newspapers in Norway is
actually even higher than that of television, as can be seen from the top portion of table 1.
This may seem particularly puzzling to an observer from the American perspective, where
in addition to newspaper circulation being rather low, people often cite local television
news as their main source of information. In contrast, while local television does exist in
Norway, it is not thought of as being in the neighborhood of newspapers when it comes
to serving as a means of information on local issues.
Table 1 also demonstrates that newspaper use does not depend on educational level as
much as one may expect. Differences in readership (defined as the percentage of resi-
dents that read a newspaper on a given day) between the university educated and lower
secondary school educated are rather small and have actually decreased in the years 2001-
2005, the years that we will be using in the estimations. This is particularly important
because it means that the possible confounding of newspaper readership with general in-
terest in politics (as measured by education) is not as big an issue as in other countries.
While the gap between educational levels shrunk, the total reach of newspapers is slowly
declining, a trend that Norway has in common with other western countries. Finally, the
bottom section of table 1 establishes that the municipalities for which the efficiency index
is available are comparable to all Norwegian communities when it comes to the reach of
regional newspapers (defined as storby dagsaviser including Aften, lokale dagsaviser and
andre lokalaviser as shown in table 10). Here regional reach is defined as the number of
newspapers sold per household. All reach variables in the remainder of this paper will
have the number of households in the municipality as the denominator. We will also use
the terms reach and penetration synonymously.
In what follows, we describe the newspaper data which provides information on the circu-
lation of newspapers in Norwegian municipalities. The efficiency index and its components
as well as the controls used in the estimation are also explained in brief.
4http://www.ssb.no/medie_en/
8
Table 1: Media reach in Norway.
TV reach 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
age 12+ 71 71 71 71 71
Newspaper reach, population 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Lower secondary school 70 77 78 74 76
Upper secondary school 83 78 80 78 77
University/college low 85 81 81 81 79
University/college high 86 86 84 87 82
All (9-79 years) 78 77 77 75 74
Newspaper reach, households 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
regional papers, all 1.037 0.996 0.985 0.978 0.969
N 431 431 431 431 431
regional papers, efficiency available 1.042 0.996 0.982 0.987 0.968
N 359 379 370 361 374
Sources: Statistics Norway, MBA.
3.1 Data Sources and media measures
The data we use was gathered from various sources. While the efficiency indicator and
its components were provided by Borge, control variables at the municipality level were
obtained from Statistics Norway and the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD).
The newspaper data stems mainly from the Norwegian Media Businesses’ Association
(Mediebedriftenes Landsforening, MBL), whose members include most of the Norwe-
gian newspapers. We add data from the Local Newspaper Association (Landslaget for
lokalaviser, LLA) for one specification, as a few newspapers are organised solely in LLA.5
Thus, the data can be broken down to three categories: newspaper data, efficiency data
and controls.
Newspaper data. The data on newspaper circulation is provided by Aviskatalogen,
a database maintained by MBL which contains annual information on the circulation of
Norwegian newspaper publications at the community level. We categorize the newspapers
in the database as follows:
(a) national newspapers (riksspredte nyhetsaviser)
(b) regional daily newspapers (storby dagsaviser)
(c) local daily newspapers (lokale dagsaviser)
(d) non-daily local newspapers (andre lokalaviser) and
(e) specialty newspapers (nisjeavisen).
We make use of this classification in order to construct various measures of newspaper
reach. In general, reach is defined as follows: reachi =
∑
n
circulationni
householdsi
, where i denotes
municipalities and n newspapers. First off, only the newspapers Dagbladet and Ver-
dens Gang are classified as tabloids. Hence, the variable tabloid penetration (in a given
municipality) will be equal to the sum of the reach of these newspapers. The national
newspaper reach includes the tabloids and Aftenposten, but not Aften (the local branch
of Aftenposten) which is considered a regional newspaper as it extensively covers issues
concerning the Oslo region. Specialty newspapers are mostly weekly newspapers such as
Fiskeribladet (Fishery Gazette) and Computerworld that cater to special interests. Even
though these are also national newspapers, they are included in a category of their own,
5Almost all of the LLA members are organized in MBL as well.
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due to their highly specialized focus.
The most important definition of newspaper reach for our purposes is regional reach
(made up of the above categories (b), (c) and (d)). This variable comprises the reach of
all newspapers that mainly convey local/regional information, i.e. in terms of journalistic
focus they serve a clearly defined local or regional market (Høst 1999). We believe regional
reach to best represent the effect of newspaper penetration on local government efficiency.6
As can be seen in table 2 and graphically in figure 1, reach and regional reach diverge
somewhat.7 Not all municipalities that have high overall newspaper readership (as in: high
reach) display high regional reach as well. On the map, this can be blatantly seen in the
center area of southern Norway. Theory predicts that only regional newspapers enhance
efficiency because the other papers are very limited in the amount of local information
they provide, yet checking the maps in the upper portion of figure 2 reveals no clear
common pattern of efficiency and regional reach.
The bottom half of figure 2 displays the geographical distribution of two further mea-
sures of voter information: regional content and regional congruence. Regional content
is essentially the sum of the regional reaches in a community, where the reaches of the
newspapers are weighted by the share of their total circulation sold in that municipality,
i.e.: contenti =
∑
n reachni · circulationni∑
i circulationni
, where i denotes municipalities and n newspa-
pers. It can be argued that a high reach in itself doesn’t mean a lot of information on
the community level. It is entirely conceivable that a high percentage of residents in a
small community reads the newspaper originating in the nearest city. Yet, if the share of
total readers living in that community is small, the newspaper will not devote a whole
lot of space to issues concerning that area and thus reach may not appropriately capture
the effect we are interested in. The content variable partly solves this problem when one
is willing to assume that a newspaper will devote more attention content-wise to those
municipalities where it sells most of its circulation. Snyder and Stro¨mberg (2008) provide
convincing evidence for this argument. To account for the diverging levels of information
contained on the various municipalities (i.e. ’content’), the reach of each and every single
newspaper in i is discounted by the readershareni =
circulationni∑
i circulationni
. The content variable
thus says how many equivalents of newspapers that are exclusively concerned with the
municipality under consideration are sold per household.
The third indicator of media influence, congruence, was proposed by Snyder and Stro¨mberg
(2008). It is supposed to help cope with the possible endogeneity of reach and content due
to their possibly being correlated with unobserved municipality or politician characteris-
tics. It is calculated as congruencei =
∑
n
circulationni∑
n circulationni
· circulationni∑
i circulationni
, where i denotes
municipalities and n newspapers, i.e. it is the sum over the reader shares of newspa-
pers in municipality i weighted by their market shares in that municipality. Intuitively,
congruence describes how well the municipalities coincide with the newspaper markets.
Put differently, it describes how actively the average newspaper sold in municipality i
6The data also enables us to calculate a Herfindahl index of circulation within a given municipality. One
may believe that a monopoly newspaper can be bribed into reporting favorably more easily. This is an
idea that has been put forward by Besley and Prat (2006). We did not find any effects of newspaper
concentration on efficiency and results are not reported in order to economize on space.
7The extremely high values of 6.56 and 4.90 for overall reach and national reach occur in the community
that harbors Oslo airport.
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covers i. That is, a value of unity for congruence would mean that the average newspaper
read in municipality i perfectly covers issues from that municipality. This measure differs
from the former information measures in that once one is willing to assume exogenously
determined geographical media markets, the variable does not depend on the possibly
endogenous reach variable (which is perhaps correlated with unobserved interest in local
matters).
We will present estimation results for all these measures employing panel data for the
period 2001-2005. We are restricted to these years as the dependent variable, efficiency,
is available for this time period only.
Efficiency data. Our measure of public sector efficiency is the efficiency index developed
by Borge et al. (2008). It relates public service production to disposable revenues. Thus,
efficiency increases when higher levels of production are extracted from given revenues.
Production is quantified by an aggregate output measure that was developed by Borge
et al. (2001) for the Norwegian authorities (Produksjonsindeks). Output comprises 17
indicators of production in the six main municipal service sectors: care for the elderly,
primary and lower secondary education (1st to 10th grade), day care, welfare benefits,
child custody, and primary health care. The measure then relates output in a municipality
to the country-wide population-weighted mean of aggregate output which is set equal to
100. The production index accounts for both quantity and quality aspects of public good
provision. Quality of public services is obviously very hard to capture, yet the production
index includes indicators such as the share of single rooms in nursing homes in an attempt
to do so.8
Then, the aggregate output measure is divided by local government revenues. Revenues
comprise own tax revenues per capita and block grants per capita from the central gov-
ernment. These revenues are adjusted by an index that describes varying costs of service
production across municipalities. This index includes factors such as population size, set-
tlement pattern, the age composition of the population and social factors. Additionally,
since the production of public services is labor-intensive, regional differences in the pay
roll tax are taken into account to capture labor costs.
In dividing production by revenues, the efficiency index then measures the efficiency of a
municipality as a percentage of the country-wide mean efficiency.
In line with Borge et al. (2008) we use the efficiency measure as the dependent variable.
We acknowledge that there may be a problem with ’division bias’ when local government
revenue appears both as a control variable and as the denominator of the efficiency in-
dex ((Borjas (1980)). Thus we also estimate an alternative specification which assumes
local output to be the dependent variable while controlling for local government revenue.
Local output is again defined as the Produksjonsindeks on the community level and so
this specification merely captures the general idea of efficiency. A positive coefficient on
newspaper circulation while holding local government revenue constant then indicates an
efficiency enhancing effect of increases in newspaper reach.
Controls. Variables accounting for heterogeneity at the local level are taken from Statis-
8The 17 sub-indices and their exact weighting are explained in detail in Borge et al. (2008).
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Figure 1: Reach, all/regional newspapers (*100).
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Figure 2: Efficiency, regional reach/content/congruence (*100).
tics Norway and the NSD. These various demographic community characteristics include
the percentage of the population classified as urban, population, average household size,
income level, religious share of the population, the immigrant share and educational level.
Political controls are the number of municipality council seats per 1000 inhabitants, the
seat share of local lists in the municipal council and the share of votes received by the
strongest party in the council.9 Finally, the effect of having an election year is captured by
year dummies because local elections take place on the same exact date in all Norwegian
municipalities.
9We also tried including voter turnout as an indicator for unobserved interest in local affairs, yet did not
include it, as it turned out to be insignificant.
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Table 2 shows summary statistics for all variables.
Table 2: Summary statistics.
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
newspaper penetration (all) 1843 1.89 0.54 0.34 6.56
regional newspaper penetration 1843 0.99 0.27 0.04 1.83
LLA newspaper penetration 1840 0.06 0.20 0.00 1.69
local newspaper penetration 1843 0.86 0.31 0.03 1.82
tabloid newspaper penetration 1843 0.64 0.36 0.03 4.04
national newspaper penetration 1843 0.78 0.48 0.03 4.90
specialty newspaper penetration 1843 0.12 0.12 0.03 1.02
non-regional newspaper penetration 1843 0.90 0.50 0.09 5.50
regional newspaper content 1843 0.17 0.19 1.6e−05 0.86
regional newspaper congruence 1843 0.15 0.17 2.9e−04 0.85
local public sector efficiency 1843 103.73 10.83 44.92 137.00
local public sector production 1843 109.98 15.73 78.92 188.12
local government revenue 1843 107.46 22.90 84.68 330.22
secondary school pct 1843 57.99 3.95 39.84 67.19
university educated pct 1843 16.50 4.98 7.93 41.97
local list seats in council pct 1843 5.88 11.52 0.00 100.00
local council seats per 1000 inh. 1840 6.12 4.32 0.10 37.57
share largest party 1843 36.10 9.96 18.52 100.00
average gross income (1000 NOK) 1843 211.88 23.47 146.00 299.70
religious population pct 1840 90.65 4.89 2.21 100.00
immigrant population pct 1840 4.08 2.42 0.23 23.01
average household size 1840 2.40 0.18 1.91 3.26
urban population pct 1840 51.42 26.86 0.00 100.00
population (1000) 1840 11.42 30.41 0.35 538.41
Tabloid, national and specialty newspapers overlap, hence they do not add up to non-regional newspaper penetration.
4 Empirical Strategy
This section describes the general estimation strategy and possible pitfalls in estimating
the effect of interest. As we have a panel dataset at our disposal, we estimate OLS with
time and municipality fixed effects. The dependent variables used are local public sector
efficiency and local public sector production. The main explanatory variables are the
measures of voter information discussed in the previous section. Thus, the estimation
equation is:
Eit = θ1 + δ · infoit + xitγ + ci + uit, (15)
where Eit denotes the efficieny (production) level in municipality i in time period t, infoit
denotes the level of voter information (as captured in our newspaper variables), xit is a
vector of municipality level controls and the unobserved effect ci is allowed to be correlated
with xit and infoit.
Exploiting the panel nature of our dataset takes care of the unobserved heterogeneity
that is constant over time, yet whenever there are omitted time-varying variables that
influence both the newspaper reach in a given municipality and also that municipality’s
efficiency, E(uit|xit, infoit, ci) 6= 0.
While finding an exogenous variation in newspaper reach (i.e. the use of 2SLS) would be
an appropriate strategy, we could not come up with a convincing instrument for reach. In
addition to using the arguably exogenous congruence variable in some of the estimations,
we believe there are good reasons to have some faith in the results obtained by simple
fixed effects estimation:
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One time-varying omitted variable driving both readership and local public sector effi-
ciency is newspaper quality. For our purposes this poses no problem as it doesn’t matter
whether it is newspaper quality or newspaper reach that is ultimately driving efficiency.
Suppose readership increases as a result of enhanced newspaper quality. At the same time
the increased quality would induce local government to be more efficient, even without
increasing reach. Two remarks on this issue are in order: First, increased newspaper
quality leads to individuals being more informed for any given level of reach. In a sense,
the effect of increased quality is the same as an increase in readership. Second, it may
lead us to overestimate the effect of pure readership (the effect if we could hold quality
fixed). So we may overestimate this effect but in the end we don’t have to distinguish
between the two because both are effects of newspapers on local public sector efficiency.10
In a related argument, unobserved ’political interest’ may induce voters to both read
more newspapers and at the same time better monitor politicians. As we have stated in
section 2, we believe that in the short run, a newspaper’s reach is mainly driven by its
entertainment value (sports news and the like). Hence, we are confident that the fixed
effect takes care of unobserved political interest, at least in a very short panel such as the
one at hand.
Aside from unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causality may be an issue. One can easily
imagine a slack local government or public administration whose actions lead to very
low efficiency and this in turn may lead to a spike in the public’s interest in obtain-
ing local information via the local newspapers. Since readership may increase with bad
management but not when things are going smoothly (i.e. ’good news is no news’), this
implies observing low levels of government efficiency simultaneously with high newspaper
readership. Because na¨ıve fixed effects estimation then causes an underestimation of the
true (positive) effect of newspaper circulation on government efficiency, we are not too
concerned about this issue and would rather interpret our estimates as lower bounds of
the true effect.11 In a similar vein, the presence of measurement error would bias our
estimates towards zero, corroborating the interpretation of δ as a lower bound on the
efficiency enhancing effects.
Another issue worth pointing out is the use of Eit and infoit in the estimation. One
could also think of using infoi,t−1, i.e. the newspaper reach in the previous year affects
government efficiency. This might make sense because while newspapers report on mis-
management right away and politicians will be pressed to react as quickly as possible,
on the other hand public budgets may be rather fixed and may perhaps only be altered
on an annual basis. However, newspapers also report on the decision making process,
and so the pros and cons of a project will be debated in the press and this may lead to
efficient decisions right away. More importantly, there is leeway for efficiency gains even
when budgets are fixed, mainly by employing these fixed funds in a more efficient manner
(e.g. by inducing the public administration to become more efficient without altering bud-
getary decisions). Another argument for not lagging the newspaper reach variable is that
10The model in section 2 does not allow for varying degrees of being informed. If such an extension were
added, newspaper quality would increase an individual’s level of information. Of course, we do not have
a newspaper quality measure. In a business economics context, however, reach may even be considered
a quality measure.
11The reverse causality case is essentially just another form of unobserved heterogeneity with the omitted
variable being the extent of corruption or mismanagement.
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it might make more sense for a politician to try and react to mismanagement accusations
right away, as people may want to have a ’quick fix’ for the problems at hand, while by
next year voters may have ’forgotten’ or there may be other problems that need urgent
attention. Either way, as will be shown in the following sections, the effects on efficiency
that we find are rather small, which may well be due to the fact that many government
decisions cannot be overturned or reversed in the short run. Thus, our results describe
the short-run actions that are actually feasible.
5 Results
As mentioned above, all estimations include municipality and year fixed effects effects.
All standard errors are clustered at the panel level (municipality). The top portion of
table 3 shows results with media influence measured as the household penetration with
regional newspapers. Column (1) displays results when the only variable is household
reach. Column (2) adds population and urbanization controls while column (3) adds a
variety of other municipality level controls. Finally, column (4) includes local government
revenues as a control in order to check whether greater fiscal capacity leads to higher
levels of budgetary slack, as suggested by Borge et al. (2008) and Revelli and Tovmo
(2007).
The fixed effects estimations suggest that increasing the reach of regional newspapers by
one percentage point increases local public sector efficiency by around .025 points. In
other words, going from zero reach of regional papers to the average reach would increase
efficiency by 2.5 points. To put these numbers into perspective, a one standard deviation
increase in reach (.27 points) raises efficiency by roughly .065 standard deviations, a
rather small effect. The controls suggest that an increase in total population and urban
population share leads to higher levels of efficiency, a result that may point to large
communities being able to better exploit economies of scale. Higher shares of immigrant
and religious population on the other hand are associated with lower levels of efficiency,
possibly pointing to these groups being less interested in local politics. Having said that,
it is not very surprising that many community level controls are of low or no significance
at all, since the standardization of the efficiency index already accounts for them. When
it comes to the political variables, the result that a larger share of seats in the municipal
parliament being taken by local lists is associated with higher efficiency is in line with the
notion that these parties are not tied to national party politics, that is, they are assumed
to exclusively have local issues on their agenda. The share of votes for the strongest
party also bears a positive coefficient, which is in line with Borge et al. (2008) who find
that a higher fragmentation of the local council lowers efficiency. This may be due to
the fact that a stronger party may accelerate the decision-making processes (and thus
save resources) as there is not as much need for negotiations with other parties.12 The
single largest predictor of efficiency is local revenue. In line with Borge et al. (2008) and
12At the same time, a negative coefficient wouldn’t have been too surprising, either, as a larger share may
make it easier to extract rents. In this respect, the positive coefficient on seats per capita is also a bit
surprising as it may lead to more need for negotiation. On the other hand a larger number of seats may
make it harder to form a rent-extracting cartel.
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Revelli and Tovmo (2007) higher revenue decreases efficiency, presumably via budgetary
slack (e.g. via exaggerated levels of public employment, low effort, or increased salaries).
The magnitude of the effect is also in the ballpark of what these studies find. Part of this
negative effect may be induced whenever communities use additional income for improving
public service quality. Because improved quality of public services is hard to capture in
the index, this may lead to a downward bias in the coefficient.
In the bottom portion of table 3 the main explanatory variable is now regional newspaper
content. This variable is the sum of household reaches of all newspapers in a community,
where the reach is weighted by the respective reader share of the newspaper in the mu-
nicipality under consideration. Again, the reader share is supposed to approximate the
share of articles in the newspaper that is concerned with issues in the respective munic-
ipality. The results from the content estimations, too, back the idea of better informed
voters being able to force their local politicians to provide them with local services more
efficiently. An increase in content by one standard deviation (.19) increases efficiency by
around .1 standard deviations.
Because the inclusion of the local government revenue variable on both sides of the equa-
tion (as a control variable and as the denominator of the efficiency index) might lead to
biased estimates, we also estimate our model with local government production as the
dependent variable. Estimation of the model with revenue included on both sides of the
equation only leads to unbiased estimates, as long as there is no measurement error. In
the presence of measurement error in the revenue variable, however, the coefficient of rev-
enue will be biased towards −1 (see, e.g. Borjas, 1980). Especially with an index variable
such as the revenue index, measurement error is almost certainly an issue. Thus, we put
a somewhat larger amount of trust in these estimates, as shown in table 4. The top part
again displays results for households reach as the main explanatory variable. Regional
newspaper content is used in the estimations shown in the bottom part . Here, the results
imply that an increase in household reach (penetration) and reach weighted by reader
share (content) both lead to higher levels of public sector production. This holds true
when local government revenue is controlled for (columns (4)). A one standard deviation
increase in content increases production by .065 standard deviations, whereas the effect is
.05 standard deviations for household reach. Overall the results are very similar to those
presented in table 3.
5.1 Robustness checks and ’placebo’ tests
As a first check of the validity of our results, we use three other measures of local in-
formation in table 5. The first is regional newspaper reach including small newspapers
registered with the LLA. As we could not obtain data on the geographical distribution of
the circulation of theses newspapers, all sold newspapers are assigned to the municipality
where the newspaper’s headquarters is located. This variable also shows a significant
positive effect on efficiency and production. As the assignment of the LLA circulation
to only one community quite possibly leads to biased estimates (especially in the case
of the content and the congruence variable that will be used further on in this section),
we refrain from using it in the further estimations. The second media measure is local
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Table 5: Dependent variables are production (1) and efficiency (2).
(1) (2)
production efficiency
other measures of local information
regional newspaper (+LLA) penetration 2.9875∗∗ (1.374) 2.6068∗∗ (1.143)
local newspaper penetration 2.8406∗∗ (1.369) 2.5363∗∗ (1.137)
regional newspaper congruence 4.6003 (3.606) 5.0277 (3.304)
variables unrelated to local information
tabloid newspaper penetration −1.7474 (1.914) 0.7474 (1.165)
national newspaper penetration −0.9259 (1.416) 0.9623 (0.909)
specialty newspaper penetration −6.1193 (8.615) −0.9168 (6.960)
non-regional newspaper penetration −0.9868 (1.374) 0.8756 (0.896)
neighbors’ regional penetration (fylke) 1.7995 (3.478) 0.5736 (2.922)
All specifications are as in column (4) of the base regressions. All estimations include municipality fixed
effects. Standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering on the panel variable (municipality code).∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
newspaper reach. These are the newspapers contained in regional reach minus the storby
dagsaviser, which have a significantly larger radius of operation (i.e. they are indeed more
regional papers than they are local papers). The magnitude and significance of the effect
is very similar to the earlier results. The final measure we would expect to exhibit a pos-
itive impact on efficiency (production) is regional congruence, as defined in section 3.1.
As expected, this variable has a positive coefficient that implies going from a situation
where the average newspaper sold in municipality i contains virtually no information on
i to a situation where the average sold newspaper is completely focused on i increases
efficiency by roughly 5 points. The effect is, however, not statistically significant. In other
robustness checks we find that the results hold when we exclude all observations where
reach or content changed by more than 10 percentage points from one year to the next.
Following Borge, we also excluded all communities with efficiency levels below 80 and
above 120. This actually leads to slightly larger coefficients of regional reach, content and
congruence as well as slightly higher significance levels.
In five additional specifications (’placebo tests’, reported in the bottom part of table 5)
we use measures of media penetration which we would suspect not to have an influence
on either efficiency or production. The first four of these variables are the household
reach of tabloid newspapers, national newspapers, specialty newspapers as well as all
newspapers excluding those that make up regional reach. As the results in table 5 show,
none of these media measures significantly impacts public sector performance. This is in
line with the idea that only media that actually carries information on municipal affairs
is suited to pressure politicians into using their funds more efficiently and none of the
above newspaper groups conveying much local content. The final measure is the average
reach of regional papers in the other municipalities that are part of municipality i’s fylke
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(county). Changes in neighboring communities’ voter information should not have an
effect on efficiency in municipality i.13 All of these measures combined provide tentative
evidence that the media effect is actually very closely related to the local nature of the
newspapers being read.
5.2 Municipality size, centrality and media effects
Three reasons suggest that the effect of newspapers on government efficiency may depend
on municipality population or urbanization. First, many smaller or non-urban communi-
ties are rather sparsely populated and newspapers might therefore play a more important
role in distributing information than in larger communities. Whenever voters in less pop-
ulous (less urban) places rely more on newspapers for information on the community this
implies a larger media effect on efficiency. Second, a larger part of the news may be
taken up by local politics in smaller communities, as there is much less going on that
the newspapers can actually pick up on (i.e. there is less ’news competition’).14 If a
larger share of the news is made up of local politics in the less populated or non-urban
communities, we would expect the effect of newspapers on efficiency and production to
be larger there. A third argument comes from Rattsø and Kalseth (1998) who find that
it is the smaller jurisdictions that overspend the most (as in spending more money on
public services than the more efficient municipalities). In a similar vein, Sørensen (1984)
finds that ’financial stress’, measured as the ratio of expenditure growth compared to
the growth of tax revenues is positively correlated with centrality. This could mean that
the smaller or non-central municipalities have the largest potential for efficiency increases
whenever public pressure increases.
Table 6: central municipalities excluded.
(1) (2)
production efficiency
regional newspaper penetration 4.6923∗∗ (2.165) 4.0004∗∗ (1.777)
regional newspaper content 15.6465∗∗ (6.264) 13.5676∗∗ (5.567)
regional newspaper congruence 10.0089 (6.793) 9.0051 (6.467)
Municipalities classified as central by Statistics Norway excluded (N=1356 remaining). All
specifications are as in column (4) of the base regressions. All estimations include municipality fixed
effects. Standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering on the panel variable (municipality code).∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 6 shows estimation results when those municipalities are excluded which have been
classified as ’central’ by Statistics Norway. This leaves us with about 75% of the original
sample. With the same reasoning we exclude communities with more than 10,000 inhab-
itants from the estimations in table 7. The cutoff point is chosen as it marks the 75th
percentile of municipality population and 10,000 is at the same time about the average
13Such effects may actually arise through some sort of yardstick competition. That is, more informed voters
in the neighboring municipality receive more efficient politics and yardstick competition may then induce
higher levels of efficiency in municipality i.
14This also means that it takes a much larger scandal to make the news in Oslo or Bergen than it does in
some small municipality up north.
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population of a Norwegian municipality (the median population is below 5,000). As both
tables show, the effects are in general much larger in the smaller Norwegian communi-
ties. In the non-central municipalities the reach effect is more than 50% larger than in
the full sample and the content effect even triples. Also, the coefficient on congruence
doubles, yet it is still not statistically significant. When considering municipalities that
harbor a population below 10,000, the results are very similar. Now, content and con-
gruence are highly significant and the effects are rather large. Finally, table 8 excludes
all municipalities that are classified as central and at the same time have a population
above 10,000. This leaves more than 85% of the observations that are in the full sample.
Again, all coefficients are statistically significant and of a larger magnitude than in the
full sample.15 Taken together, the newspaper effect seems to be especially important in
these rural communities.
Table 7: large municipalities excluded.
(1) (2)
production efficiency
regional newspaper penetration 3.9655∗∗ (1.676) 3.5771∗∗ (1.393)
regional newspaper content 10.9711∗∗∗ (3.825) 9.2288∗∗∗ (2.726)
regional newspaper congruence 14.8288∗∗∗ (4.659) 12.9027∗∗∗ (3.551)
Municipalities with population above 10,000 excluded (N=1354 remaining). All specifications are as in
column (4) of the base regressions. All estimations include municipality and year fixed effects. Standard
errors in parentheses allow for clustering on the panel variable (municipality code).∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 8: central municipalities above 10,000 in population excluded.
(1) (2)
production efficiency
regional newspaper penetration 4.0453∗∗ (1.576) 3.6142∗∗∗ (1.304)
regional newspaper content 11.0027∗∗∗ (3.462) 10.3156∗∗∗ (2.662)
regional newspaper congruence 10.5758∗∗ (4.659) 9.7713∗∗ (4.108)
Municipalities with population above 10,000 and at the same time classified as ’central’ are excluded
(N=1588 remaining). All specifications are as in column (4) of the base regressions. All estimations
include municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering on the
panel variable (municipality code). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
6 Conclusion
This paper set out to explore whether newspaper circulation affects public sector efficiency
in Norwegian municipalities. We develop a model illustrating that a more informed elec-
torate provides incentives for incumbent politicians to behave well. Since newspapers are
assumed to serve as a source of information for voters, their circulation in a jurisdiction
should have an impact on policy outcomes.
15As a robustness check, we excluded all municipalities with a population below 1,000. This leads to slightly
higher precision in the estimations.
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We test this theoretical prediction using panel data on Norwegian municipalities, where
the main variables are public sector efficiency and various measures of electorate infor-
mation based on newspaper circulation. The results of the empirical analysis support our
theoretical argument that a larger share of informed voters goes with larger efficiency.
We find a particularly strong effect of the newspaper variables in small and non-central
municipalities.
Regarding the overall rather small effects, we believe that one important reason may be
that while voters care about efficiency in general, the weighting in the production index,
or its sub-indices even, most likely do not perfectly mirror varying local preferences across
municipalities. The production index serves as a monitoring device for the central govern-
ment, yet, using indicator weights for particular services which rely on country-wide mean
values, it cannot perfectly take into account differing preferences across municipalities.
An important implication of our results then is that monitoring local politics via news-
papers may provide an essential complement to monitoring by the central government.
As local newspapers cater to local preferences, they are an important institution when it
comes to ensuring the accountability of local governments.
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Appendix
Table 9: Description of Variables.
Variable Description
Aviskatalogen data
newspaper penetration Percent of households reading a newspaper. values > 100
denote more than one paper on average.
tabloids Dagbladet, Verdens Gang.
regional newspapers Storby dagsaviser (including Aften), lokale dagsaviser, andre
lokalaviser as shown in table 10. Parentheses after
riksspredte nyhetsaviser and storby dagsaviser indicate that
these papers are sometimes classified differently.
This alternative classification is not used.
national newspapers Riksspredte nyhetsaviser as in table 10.
specialty newspapers Nisjeaviser as shown in table 10.
content The newspaper penetration in municipality i, weighted
by the share of newspaper i’s total sales occuring
in that municipality.
congruence Content of a newspaper weighted by the newspaper’s
market share in the municipality.
LLA data
LLA newspapers Local newspapers not included in the Aviskatalogen.
Regionally disaggregated circulation data not available, the full
circulation is assigned the paper’s home municipality
Local gov’t data
local public sector efficiency Official efficiency index, developed by Borge et al. (2008)
local public sector production Official production index, developed by Borge et al. (2001)
local government revenue Official revenue index
NSD regional data
secondary school pct % of population over 16 years whose highest degree is secondary
university educated pct % of population over 16 years whose highest degree is tertiary
KOSTRA variables (ssb.no)
local list seats in council pct Percent of seats in the municipal council taken by non-national
parties (only one election in the period under consideration: 2003)
local council seats per 1000 inh. Municipalities set the number of seats, as long as lower limit is kept
share largest party vote share of the largest party in the municipal council
average gross income (1000 NOK) Per taxpayer
religious population pct Percent of residents registered with the state church
immigrant population pct none
average household size none
urban population pct none
population (1000) none
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Table 10: Newspapers by classification.
Newspaper classification
DAGBLADET, alm. dager riksspredte nyhetsaviser
DAGBLADET, Fredagsmagasin riksspredte nyhetsaviser
DAGBLADET, lørdag riksspredte nyhetsaviser
DAGBLADET, Magasinet riksspredte nyhetsaviser
DAGBLADET, søndag riksspredte nyhetsaviser
DAGBLADET, Søndagsmagasin riksspredte nyhetsaviser
VG - VERDENS GANG, alm. dager riksspredte nyhetsaviser
VG - VERDENS GANG, lørdag riksspredte nyhetsaviser
VG - VERDENS GANG, søndag riksspredte nyhetsaviser
AFTENPOSTEN, morgenutgaven riksspredte nyhetsaviser (storby dagsaviser)
AFTENPOSTEN, morgenutgaven lørdag riksspredte nyhetsaviser (storby dagsaviser)
AFTENPOSTEN, søndag riksspredte nyhetsaviser (storby dagsaviser)
AFTEN storby dagsaviser (riksspredte nyhetsaviser)
ADRESSEAVISEN storby dagsaviser
BERGENS TIDENDE storby dagsaviser
BERGENSAVISEN storby dagsaviser
DAGSAVISEN storby dagsaviser
ROGALANDS AVIS storby dagsaviser
STAVANGER AFTENBLAD storby dagsaviser
AGDERPOSTEN lokale dagsaviser
AKERSHUS AMTSTIDENDE lokale dagsaviser
ALTAPOSTEN lokale dagsaviser
AURA AVIS lokale dagsaviser
AVISA NORDLAND lokale dagsaviser
BLADET VESTERA˚LEN lokale dagsaviser
BRØNNØYSUNDS AVIS lokale dagsaviser
BUDSTIKKA lokale dagsaviser
DRAMMENS TIDENDE lokale dagsaviser
EIDSVOLL ULLENSAKER BLAD lokale dagsaviser
FÆDRELANDSVENNEN lokale dagsaviser
FARSUNDS AVIS lokale dagsaviser
FINNMARK DAGBLAD lokale dagsaviser
FINNMARKEN lokale dagsaviser
FIRDA lokale dagsaviser
FREDRIKSSTAD BLAD lokale dagsaviser
FREMOVER lokale dagsaviser
GJENGANGEREN lokale dagsaviser
GLA˚MDALEN lokale dagsaviser
GUDBRANDSDØLEN DAGNINGEN lokale dagsaviser
HADELAND lokale dagsaviser
HALDEN ARBEIDERBLAD lokale dagsaviser
HAMAR ARBEIDERBLAD lokale dagsaviser
HARSTAD TIDENDE lokale dagsaviser
HAUGESUNDS AVIS lokale dagsaviser
HELGELAND ARBEIDERBLAD lokale dagsaviser
LAAGENDALSPOSTEN lokale dagsaviser
LINDESNES lokale dagsaviser
LOFOTPOSTEN lokale dagsaviser
MOSS AVIS lokale dagsaviser
NAMDALSAVISA lokale dagsaviser
NORDLYS lokale dagsaviser
OPPLAND ARBEIDERBLAD lokale dagsaviser
ØSTLANDETS BLAD lokale dagsaviser
ØSTLANDS-POSTEN lokale dagsaviser
ØSTLENDINGEN lokale dagsaviser
PORSGRUNNS DAGBLAD lokale dagsaviser
RANA BLAD lokale dagsaviser
RINGERIKES BLAD lokale dagsaviser
RJUKAN ARBEIDERBLAD lokale dagsaviser
ROMERIKES BLAD lokale dagsaviser
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Table 10: Newspapers by classification (continued).
Newspaper classification
ROMSDALS BUDSTIKKE lokale dagsaviser
SANDEFJORDS BLAD lokale dagsaviser
SARPSBORG ARBEIDERBLAD lokale dagsaviser
SMAALENENES AVIS lokale dagsaviser
SØR-TRØNDELAG lokale dagsaviser
SUNNHORDLAND lokale dagsaviser
SUNNMØRSPOSTEN lokale dagsaviser
TELEMARKSAVISA lokale dagsaviser
TELEN lokale dagsaviser
TIDENS KRAV lokale dagsaviser
TØNSBERGS BLAD lokale dagsaviser
TROMS FOLKEBLAD lokale dagsaviser
TROMSØ lokale dagsaviser
TRØNDER-AVISA lokale dagsaviser
VALDRES lokale dagsaviser
VARDEN lokale dagsaviser
AGDER (Flekkefjords Tidende) andre lokalaviser
A˚NDALSNES AVIS andre lokalaviser
ANDØYPOSTEN andre lokalaviser
ARBEIDETS RETT andre lokalaviser
A˚SANE TIDENDE andre lokalaviser
ASKØYVÆRINGEN andre lokalaviser
AUST AGDER BLAD andre lokalaviser
BØMLO-NYTT andre lokalaviser
BYAVISA TØNSBERG andre lokalaviser
BYGDANYTT andre lokalaviser
BYGDEBLADET RANDABERG og RENNESØY andre lokalaviser
BYGDEPOSTEN andre lokalaviser
DALANE TIDENDE andre lokalaviser
DEMOKRATEN andre lokalaviser
DRIVA andre lokalaviser
EIKER AVIS andre lokalaviser
EIKERBLADET andre lokalaviser
FANAPOSTEN andre lokalaviser
FINNMARKSPOSTEN andre lokalaviser
FIRDA TIDEND andre lokalaviser
FIRDAPOSTEN andre lokalaviser
FJORDABLADET andre lokalaviser
FJORDENES TIDENDE andre lokalaviser
FJORDINGEN andre lokalaviser
FOSNA-FOLKET andre lokalaviser
FRAMTID I NORD andre lokalaviser
GJESDALBUEN andre lokalaviser
GRIMSTAD ADRESSETIDENDE andre lokalaviser
HALDEN DAGBLAD andre lokalaviser
HALLINGDØLEN andre lokalaviser
HAMAR DAGBLAD andre lokalaviser
HARAMSNYTT andre lokalaviser
HARDANGER FOLKEBLAD andre lokalaviser
HELGELANDS BLAD andre lokalaviser
HITRA-FRØYA andre lokalaviser
HORDALAND andre lokalaviser
HORDALAND FOLKEBLAD andre lokalaviser
INDRE AKERSHUS BLAD andre lokalaviser
INNHERREDS FOLKEBLAD OG VERDALINGEN andre lokalaviser
JÆRBLADET andre lokalaviser
JARLSBERG AVIS andre lokalaviser
KRAGERØ BLAD VESTMAR andre lokalaviser
KVINNHERINGEN andre lokalaviser
LEVANGER-AVISA andre lokalaviser
LIERPOSTEN andre lokalaviser
LILLESANDS-POSTEN andre lokalaviser
LOFOT-TIDENDE andre lokalaviser
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Table 10: Newspapers by classification (continued).
Newspaper classification
LOKALAVISA SØR-ØSTERDAL andre lokalaviser
LOKALAVISEN OPPEGA˚RD andre lokalaviser
MALVIK-BLADET andre lokalaviser
MØRE-NYTT andre lokalaviser
MOSS DAGBLAD andre lokalaviser
NORDDALEN andre lokalaviser
NORDHORDLAND andre lokalaviser
NORDSTRANDS BLAD andre lokalaviser
NYE TROMS andre lokalaviser
OPDALINGEN andre lokalaviser
ØYENE andre lokalaviser
RAKKESTAD AVIS andre lokalaviser
RAUMNES andre lokalaviser
RINGSAKER BLAD andre lokalaviser
RØYKEN OG HURUMS AVIS andre lokalaviser
SALTENPOSTEN andre lokalaviser
SANDE AVIS andre lokalaviser
SANDNESPOSTEN andre lokalaviser
SETESDØLEN andre lokalaviser
SØGNE OG SOGNDALEN BUDSTIKKE andre lokalaviser
SOLABLADET andre lokalaviser
SØR-VARANGER AVIS andre lokalaviser
STJØRDALENS BLAD andre lokalaviser
STRANDBUEN andre lokalaviser
STRILEN andre lokalaviser
SVELVIKSPOSTEN andre lokalaviser
TRØNDERBLADET andre lokalaviser
TVEDESTRANDSPOSTEN andre lokalaviser
VARINGEN andre lokalaviser
VENNESLA TIDENDE andre lokalaviser
VEST-TELEMARK BLAD andre lokalaviser
VESTERAALENS AVIS andre lokalaviser
VESTLANDSNYTT andre lokalaviser
VESTNYTT andre lokalaviser
VIGGA andre lokalaviser
VIKEBLADET VESTPOSTEN andre lokalaviser
YTRE SOGN AVIS andre lokalaviser
YTRINGEN andre lokalaviser
ARBEIDERAVISA nisjeaviser
A´VVIR nisjeaviser
COMPUTERWORLD nisjeaviser
DAG OG TID nisjeaviser
DAGBLADET Sportsmagasin nisjeaviser
DAGENMAGAZINET nisjeaviser
DAGENS NÆRINGSLIV nisjeaviser
DAGENS NÆRINGSLIV, lørdag nisjeaviser
FINANSAVISEN nisjeaviser
FISKAREN nisjeaviser
FISKERIBLADET nisjeaviser
KLASSEKAMPEN nisjeaviser
KORSETS SEIER nisjeaviser
MORGENBLADET nisjeaviser
NATIONEN nisjeaviser
NY TID nisjeaviser
SOGN AVIS nisjeaviser
STALL-SKRIKET nisjeaviser
TIPS nisjeaviser
UKEAVISEN LEDELSE nisjeaviser
UTROP nisjeaviser
VA˚RT LAND, fredag - lørdag nisjeaviser
VA˚RT LAND, mandag - torsdag nisjeaviser
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